Cartels were legal to a large extent in Austria until the country's EU accession in 1995. We examine archival material on registered horizontal cartels to learn about their inner working. Applying content analysis to legally binding cartel contracts, we comprehensively document different collusion methods along the lines described by Stigler (1964) . Quota cartels employ regular reporting schemes and use compensation mechanisms for departures from set quotas. Specialisation cartels divide markets and rely the least on information exchange and punishment. Price and payment condition cartels primarily aim to prevent secret price cuts, requiring information provision upon request, allow for discretionary decision-taking and (sometimes immediate) punishment. These stylised facts on the contractual arrangements suggest that the possibility to write legally binding agreements was employed to address the usual obstacles to sustaining collusion. 
Introduction
We study archival materials from registered cartels in Austria to learn about the inner workings of cartels. Many countries allowed firms to engage in non-competitive practices, by registering agreements with a government authority. This was the case in several European countries, such as Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, after World War II, or in the United States during the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). In Austria, this episode ended in the mid-1990s with the country's accession to the European Union.
To grasp the widespread activities and rules cartels stick to, we follow a descriptive approach. This enables us to present stylized facts that take into account theoretical insights and real world observations at once. Davis and Fletcher (2013) call for a better understanding of the mechanisms that firms employ to overcome the difficulties inherent in agreeing to collude. We hope to contribute to this understanding using the following approach. Based on established wisdom summarized exceptionally well in Stigler (1964) and in-depth content analysis of cartel contracts, we developed a coding scheme 1 capturing contract characteristics according to four methods of collusion: quotas, specialization, price fixing and payment conditions. Using a flexible and content-sensitive approach we developed categories to provide a broad description of these cartels.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. Registered cartels included only a small subset of firms active in the Austrian economy. More than half of the cartels used more than one method of collusion. For instance, roughly one third of the cartels combine price and payment condition clauses. In quota cartels, the prevalence of provisions for information exchange and compensation mechanisms is in line with ideas put forward by Stigler (1964) and recent theory developed by Harrington and Skrzypacz (2011) . Almost all quota cartels belong to the manufacturing sector. On average, quota cartels have fewer members compared to price and specialization cartels. Specialization agreements (allocating the market either regionally, by product, or by customer) stand out in terms of their simplicity, hardly specifying information provision requirements and or punishment rules.
Cartels fixing prices are comparatively large and often employ other methods of collusion as well. They more often use norms to prevent competition along dimensions other than price.
Payment condition agreements primarily increase transparency, indicating an attempt to prevent secret price cuts. They tend to be the most complex agreements, relying more on information provision upon request and explicit punishment schemes. Almost three quarters of all agreements specify some form of punishment for contract violation. We also emphasize that legal cartels and their registration were part of the Austrian version of corporatism called "Social Partnership," in which price ceilings (increases) were effectively regulated.
Cartel contracts thus primarily served as a tool to realize the permitted maximum price avoiding its undercutting. Overall, we find that the agreements tend to address issues that the literature (see for instance Stigler (1964) ) has raised as potential obstacles to sustaining collusion: they use compensation schemes, reporting requirements, rules for entry and exit, and ensure quick and credible punishment.
We contribute to an emerging body of literature comparing the details of inner workings of several cartels within a specific institutional environment. Levenstein and Suslow (2006) survey the literature on domestic and international cartels in different legal environments. Harrington (2006) describes the practices of 20 detected cartels, based on European Commission decisions over 2000 -2004 . Levenstein and Suslow (2011 focuses on the factors influencing duration of detected international cartels. Connor (2003) analyses the duration, the welfare impact and antitrust fines for international cartels discovered after 1990. While the aforementioned papers focus on environments were cartels were illegal, several studies focus on settings were cartels were legal. Taylor (2007) studies 66 cartels during the NIRA episode 1933-1935 when cartels were legal in the United States. He examines which industries were successful in achieving collusive outcomes and which provisions in cartel contracts led to successful cartelization. Chicu et al. (2013) and Vickers and Ziebarth (2014) study the cement industry during the NIRA episode. Most closely related to our paper is the study of Finnish legal cartels by Hyytinen et al. (2014) , identifying common patterns across cartel contracts within a specific legal environment. We also rely on insights from detailed case studies and empirical analysis of individual cartels in both legal and illegal environments including Genesove and Mullin (2001) , Asker (2010) and Röller and Steen (2006) to develop the categories used to describe the cartels. While the contract clauses used by legal cartels may offer useful insights for the detection of illegal cartels, we emphasize also that comparing cartels in legal and illegal environments is not straightforward. Cross-sectional studies of detected illegal cartels contain information on the actual practices of the cartels, but may suffer from detection bias. Our study contains all legal cartels, but cartel practices may have differed from the contractual clauses. Legal cartels could openly engage in practices such as compensation, punishment, and information transfers, which illegal cartels must hide. Legal cartels can openly instruct all employees to behave according to the agreement, whereas in illegal cartels it is less clear who is informed and bound by the agreement. Finally, we do not observe clauses specifying rules for bidding rings, which are often among detected cartels (see for instance Harrington (2006) ). Bidding rings also illegal in Austria.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the institutional background, describing how cartel registration worked and its place in the Austrian system of "Social Partnership." Section 3 describes the archived cartel registry and the construction of our sample, as well as which industries are represented. Section 4 presents the contract characteristics. We first give an overview of the different collusion methods, the multiple use thereof, and the corresponding cartel and contract characteristics.
We then go into more detail outlining the presence of additional clauses across the different collusion methods. Next we examine governance structures, like decision making bodies and their voting rules, cartel management, rules for information exchange, compensation and punishment schemes, as well as the regulations on entry and exit. Section 5 summarizes the key findings by collusion method. Section 6 concludes.
Institutional Background
In this section we explain why and how registered cartels existed in Austria. First, we explain the economic and historic background for the Austrian cartel law. Next, we describe the limits for registered cartels and incentives to registers. At last, we present information on cartel proceedings and the regulatory background that was dominated by social partnership.
Cartel Law in Austria
The legal environment in Austria had always been rather favorable towards cooperative behavior. We focus on the post World War II period. 2 Although part of the Allied Council (both Soviet and United States elements) were opposed (see Johnstone (1951) ), the first cartel law was passed in 1951. To understand the positive attitude towards cartelization at the time, it is necessary to bear in mind the Austrian macroeconomic conditions. Austria had no access to external finance on the capital market and relied on economic aid from abroad accounting for up to 20% of GDP in the late 1940s. Cartels were considered to be a stabilizing force in the economy. 3 Explanatory remarks to the 1951 law state that cartels are "not necessarily causing damage to the economy." Instead, they may be "useful in their market stabilizing function" and "essential in foreign trade" (Tüchler, 2003, p. 131 Since we had access to registry files from 1973 on, the 1972 law is the most relevant for our purposes. According to the 1972 law, cartel agreements were defined as all binding agreements aiming at "regulation or limitation of competition, in particular with respect to production, sales, or prices" (KartG 1972, §1) . The law included a separate provision for "concerted practices"-cartel like behavior without explicit agreement-and "cartels by effect" (KartG 1972, §1) . Registration of such cartelized activity was required upon notification by the chairman of the cartel court (KartG 1972, §16) . Conversely, it was not required to register concerted practices and cartels by effect, as long as there was no such request. Such a request occurred only once. 5 Finally, de minimis cartels (where the companies involved had less than 5% national and 25% local market share) were not obliged to register, although some did.
Firms had to write a contract defining their cartel arrangement, as well as providing an economic justification thereof. Upon approval, the contract along with possible supplements (price lists, calculation schemes, etc.) was then filed in the cartel register.
The decision as to whether a cartel agreement was registered was to be made by a three-judge panel at the cartel court. Registration required that the cartel was economically justified. The judicature never formally nor materially clarified its interpretation of "economic justification," since it did not prohibit cartels based on the lack of it. Yet individual cartels were prohibited, when the contract on which they were based was deemed immoral according to the Austrian civil code. For example, a bidding ring was declared illegal in 1975. Consequently, there are no bidding rings among the registered cartels. Furthermore, the cartel law intended to contain the pressure both on members to stay within the cartel and to non-members to be part of the cartel. Hence, the period of notice for exit was limited to six months and penalties for an exit were forbidden.
In principle, unregistered cartel agreements were subject to criminal law. Criminal law needs enforcement by the government. Official conviction statistics show impositions only in 1976, 1980 and from 2000 onwards, suggesting that the fear of being caught and fined for operating an illegal cartel was not the main incentive to register a cartel.
A registered contract constituted a legally binding agreement. The cartel could thereby be enforced either through fines and arbitration proceedings as specified in the contract, or through legal action in the courts. 6 The legally binding character of the agreements distinguishes the Austrian case from other environments where collusive agreements may have been legal, but were not enforceable in court, for example in the U.S. during the NIRA episode.
Cartel Registration within Austrian System of "Social Partnership"
To understand the cartel activities in Austria it is important to keep in mind the institutional structure governing economic activities in the period of study. Economic agents were represented in central organizations. The Chamber of Labor ("Arbeiterkammer") represented the interests of dependent employees, and the Economic Chamber ("Wirtschaftskammer") those of business. Membership in the respective chamber was mandatory for all dependent employees and firms (and still is). In addition, employees were represented by the Trade Union Federation, and farmers by the Chamber of Agriculture ("Landwirtschaftskammer"). These four major interest groups were members of the "Parity Commission" which was an informal body seeking to find compromises on price and wage issues.
The institutional set-up at the court and within this system of "Social Partnership" is particularly relevant for the study of cartelization activities. Figure 1 illustrates the cartel registration process and the involvement of social partners.
First, the three chambers (Agriculture, Labor, and Commerce) were parties in the cartel application proceedings. Additionally, the federal financial agency was party of the proceedings as an attorney general for the federal government. The parties were eligible to request a review of an application as well as to appeal to the cartel court's decision. 7
Second, there was the "Parity Committee on Cartel Matters" that prepared the expert opinion for the court. It consisted of six members and two executive secretaries. The Chambers of Commerce and Labor each proposed three members and jointly appointed the two secretaries. The committee had to prepare an expert opinion on every cartel application, in particular on the economic justification of the agreement. Decisions were taken by a three member panel of the cartel court. The panel consisted of a professional judge as well as two lay judges, appointed by the Chambers of Commerce and Labor respectively. The panel normally relied only on unanimous expert opinions by the Parity Committee. Representing both consumers and workers in this institutional setup, the 6 Fines were subject to the judge's discretion and could also be lowered relative to the fines specified in the cartel contract.
7 The observed review requests are documented below in Table 8 . The Chamber of Labor requested reviews significantly more often in quota cartels of what Stigler (1964) considered the most efficient form of coordinated behavior. The federal financing agency was more active in legal issues. (KartG 1972 and Farnleitner (1977)) Chamber of Labor often accepted cartels as part of greater compromise. This significantly weakened cartel review capabilities and explains that cartels were never denied registration due to lack of economic justification. Third, the Parity Commission's Subcommittee on Prices reviewed applications for price increases, as illustrated on the right panel of Figure 1 . Applications came either from individual companies or trade associations representing a specific sector. Applications had to be justified with cost increases which could not be compensated by improvements in efficiency. Clearly, this centralized mechanism for realizing price adjustments could serve as a coordination device in collusive activities. Most of the registered cartels were part of this regime.
With Austria's accession to the European Community, European competition law had to be applied and was enforced by the European Commission. Thus, from Jan 1st, 1995 on, the approval of cartels that may affect trade was restricted to comply with E.U. competition law and-for the first time-subject to enforcement by the European Commission. 8
The Austrian Cartel Registry
The registry lists about 125 cartel folders. A typical cartel folder includes an overview summarizing the list of events pertaining to an agreement. Every change in the agreement required re-approval by the cartel court. These could be a change in the contract due to a new firm joining the cartel or as simple as the representative of the cartel had changed. In addition to this overview, the folder includes the contract and amendments to the contract.
The 125 files in the registry contain in total 149 agreements. We consolidated consecutive (for instance involving extending the duration of a contract) and add-on agreements (adding another member to an existing contract) into one contract each, and removed contracts that actually resembled a merger. We classified the remaining 99 contracts into three groups: pure vertical agreements that also included 12 vertical restraints originating from single upstream producers, 7 horizontal agreements with vertical elements, and 80 pure horizontal agreements. 9 In the ensuing presentation, we concentrate on these 80 pure horizontal agreements. Most of the cartels were initially registered in the 1950s. In 1973, continuing cartels were required to register again. We observe the cartel agreements that were (re-)registered in 1973 or later.
Industries covered by the cartel registry
To examine which industries were covered by cartel registration, we classify the observed registered cartels according to a two digit industry classification. The details are reported in Table 26 in the Appendix. For many industries, we do not observe any registered cartels. This includes the construction industry which we probably do not observe because the cartel law explicitly prohibited bidding rings.
Based on the 2-digit classification which typically includes several product markets, the number of firms participating in cartels is small relative to the total number of firms. This indicates that formal cartels were not as widespread as one might have expected. Several explanations can be offered for this, given the legal environment and weak enforcement described in Section 2. One possible reason is the strong concentration in individual product markets. Further, arrangements serving to raise prices could be implemented easily without invoking any formal agreement, via price regulation by application of the industry associations to the Parity Commission. After all, administering and implementing a cartel agreement was a costly and time consuming enterprise. In addition, de minimis cartels 9 We also treat cartels as purely horizontal when they involved collective vertical restraints orchestrated by several upstream firms but without participation of downstream firms.
were exempt from the registration requirement. Cartels by effect and concerted practices were only required to register upon request. Commentators state that cartels consequently often operated informally, also avoided the publicity of the cartel register (Tüchler, 2003, p. 134) . In Table 27 in the Appendix, we also match our cartels into the 4-digit NACE classification. This is done only for manufacturing on the basis of the 1995 Statistics of Manufacturing, as we lack details on the service sector at the 4-digit level. The match of products addressed in the cartels into the 4-digit NACE code is closer than the 2-digit NACE code but still imperfect. Yet the comparison of total number of cartelized firms with the firms at the 4-digit level is indicative of the coverage of the cartels. 10
Collusion Methods and Contract Characteristics
In this section, we describe the cartels for which we found contracts in the Austrian Cartel Court's register. We employ a coding protocol to format the information contained in the contracts as archived in the cartel registry. Based on this protocol we describe each cartel contract by a vector of contract clauses. In total, we coded 109 different contract clauses as specified in the contracts. However the average contract includes only 25 clauses. Including dates, classifications etc., we specified 200 categories in total.
Most of the contract clauses are coded as binary variables describing whether or not a specific contract clause is part of the agreement. For variables like the industry classification we use nominal categories. Dates, frequencies etc. are numerically coded. For other information, e.g. the products involved we resort to text format. 11
In the first subsection, we survey the cartels by main method of collusion and broad cartel characteristics. In the second subsection, we discuss auxiliary collusive clauses. In the third subsection, we look at cartel governance.
Main Collusive Instruments: An Overview
Here we introduce the main contract clauses we consider and their frequency of appearance in cartel contracts. We also present marginal distributions in terms of cartel size, duration, and complexity. Finally, we describe economic justification provided by cartel applicants 10 The number of firms in the cartels sometimes exceeds the number of firms indicated in the 1995 statistics. This includes sugar (15.83), beer (15.96), and manufacturing of basic iron and steel (27.10). Altogether, the number of firms in manufacturing cartels exceeds the number of firms in the 1995 official statistics in 9 out of 63 manufacturing cartels. The reason is apparently a considerable consolidation in these industries before 1995. Further, for beer four different cartels with overlapping participants are observed in the registry.
11 For a detailed description of our procedure see Fink et al. (2014) .
and to what extent cartel applications were subject to reviews requested by the Parity Committee.
Instruments to influence market outcome
We start by defining the contract clauses to describe the main instrument(s) a cartel used to influence the market outcome. We base the selection of our main collusion instruments on Stigler (1964) who compares different methods of collusion with respect to their effectiveness against secret price cuts-the strongest impediment to cartel stability. This impediment is shared by legal cartels as well. Most comprehensive is a merger, followed by a joint sales agency. For all other methods, Stigler argues that secret violations of the agreement are profitable. Thus these methods need enforcement: Significant deviations need to be detected. The faster and the more complete detection is, the more stable is the cartel.
Stigler singles out quota agreements as the most efficient way of preventing secret price cuts, but emphasizes that they require output inspection and appropriate formulas for redistribution for departures from quotas. Harrington and Skrzypacz (2011) show that collusion in such a quota cartel can be sustained with truthful reporting of private information on sales.
The direct allocation of customers is the next most effective method according to Stigler, as long as demand growth of the custom of various cartel members does not diverge too much. Customer allocation can also be achieved via exclusive territories.
Finally Stigler identifies pure price fixing cartels as the ones prone most to destabilizing action by the cartel members. It requires obtaining the transaction prices from the buyers to detect secret price cutting-although an oligopolist would make secret price cuts only for buyers beyond a certain size. He finally states that there are many different ways for secret price cutting that are difficult to grasp.
In order to identify these methods in our cartel registry, we distinguish between the main instruments listed by Stigler: quotas, specialization, price. We add the separate category payment conditions, which is the most frequent clause indicating the risk of secret price cuts:
• quota includes agreements on sales, output, or purchases of the participating firms relative to each other, typically on the basis of expected aggregate output.
• specialization includes agreements on products, customers, suppliers or territories.
Product specialization cartels assign one group of products to one firm and another group of products to the next firm. Customer or supplier specialization agreements assign either customers or suppliers to cartel members. Territorial specialization refers to agreements on exclusive territories or an allocation of customers based on least-freight. 12
• price includes agreements on at least one of the following categories: fixed price, price floor, price book, common costing sheet, price adjustment. 13
• payment conditions include agreements on the terms of payments, such as cash discounts, early payment discounts, and deferred payment. In Table 1 we present numbers and frequencies of appearance of these instruments in the contracts. Among the 80 horizontal agreements, 37 (46.3%) contracts contain quota clauses. 10 (12.5%) of these cartels solely use this main clause. Almost three times as many, namely 27 (33.8%) combine the quota close with one or more other clauses. The most frequent combination is that of quota, price and payment conditions.
We observe relatively few (26) cartel contracts containing a specialization clause, and even fewer pure specialization cartels. This may be due to the cartel court approving customer allocation primarily in combination with customer-specific investment.
Of the 80 registered horizontal cartels, 41 (51.3%) contain price agreements. This is a large number given that prices could also be coordinated on via the Subcommittee on Prices. We even find seven pure price fixing cartels. Agreements on a high price can easily be undermined by granting favorable payment conditions. It is therefore not surprising that 27 of the 41 price fixing cartels also include payment conditions clauses.
Next, we cross-tabulate other contract characteristics with these instruments to influence the market outcome. Again, we separately report contracts that feature a specific main clause exclusively ('pure cartels'). In 
Cartel Orientation
We distinguish between buyer and seller, and import and export cartels and call this cartel orientation. In Table 3 we cross-tabulate these instruments. In what follows, observe that most contracts contain multiple clauses. For instance, the number 18.9 in top right of the table indicates that of the 37 agreement including a quota clause amongst other clauses, 18.9 percent (or seven cartels) also include a clause pertaining to exports. The numbers in the last row show that most of the registered cartels are seller cartels: 78 of the 80 cartels in the sample contain a seller cartel orientation. The total number exceeds 80, because some cartels include more than one orientation. For instance the sugar cartel not only regulated domestic sales, but also imports, exports and the purchase of sugar beets. Note in particular that all pure price, payment condition and specialization cartels are also seller cartels. The only two cartels that are not at all sales oriented are a pure quota and a quota/specialization cartel. About one sixth of the cartels including a quota or a specialization clause and roughly a third of the pure quota cartels are buyer cartels. More than one fourth of the cartels involving a specialization clause are export oriented. Yet there is no export cartel focusing only on pricing or payment arrangements. Secret price cutting for export markets appears to be less of a concern for registered cartels.
Cartel size
We use the number of participants as specified in the first agreement as a measure of cartel size. Table 4 contains cartel size by instrument to influence market outcome. We observe that the number of participants in quota cartels is substantively smaller both in terms of average and maximum number of participants. One may infer that implementing quotas is easier with a relatively small number of cartelists. Table 5 provides details by cartel clause. Pure quota cartels turn out to be atypical: they exhibit a shorter average and median than any other cartel type. This may in part be due to social partners being more skeptical of quota cartels, and shorter time limits were part of a compromise within the system of social partnership.
For example, three quota only beer cartels did not remain registered beyond 1978. Notes: 52 cartels were left censored. The start of the median cartel is censored for all clauses but "only spec." clauses and thus set to January 1st, 1976. Two cartels were terminated before January 1st 1976.
The duration is set to zero. Cartels still registered in 2006 were censored to December 31st 2006 when the registry was formally closed.
Cartel complexity
We proxy cartel complexity by the number of pages of the first cartel contract available.
These are presented in Table 6 . To illustrate the effect of cartel size, the first three columns refer to absolute numbers, and the second three to numbers per cartel participant. Not unexpectedly, multiple clause cartels involve more voluminous contracts than single clause cartels in both, absolute number of pages and pages per cartel participant. The longest contract involving 105 pages is that of a sugar cartel using all four instruments to influence market outcomes. Pure price cartels also stand out: they involve by far the shortest contract format. Restricting secret price cutting appears to be the most complex single task: pure payment condition contract are the longest within the group of cartels focusing on one instrument only.
Economic justification of cartel formation
Upon application the cartelists were required to provide an economic justification for the formation of the cartel. Whereas this may have been primarily empty rhetoric, it is worth documenting the deficiencies that the cartelists claimed to resolve within a collusive arrangement. This was presumably done to appease the social partners involved in the approval process.
Overall, the justification provided most frequently is lack of job security (in 35 percent of all contracts), which is not surprising as the Chamber of Labor played a significant role in the registration process. Only in the applications of pure price fixing and pure specialization cartels job security is mentioned less often. The two next most prominent justifications are lack of security of supply (29 percent) and excessive competition (27 percent). Security of supply is considered an issue especially in (pure) quota and in specialization cartels.
Pure price and pure payment condition cartels frequently invoke lack of transparency of competition. Agreements on payment conditions are primarily attempts to avoid secret price cuts and thus improve "transparency." Lack of economies of scale and more so, scope are issues primarily addressed in cartels invoking quota and specialization clauses.
"Excessive competition" stands out as a justification in pure quota cartels. Note: Table reports percentage of agreements with row characteristics involving column characteristics. The cartel application could contain several of the reasons. Therefore, the row percentages do not sum up to 100.
Cartel application review
The cartel application was sometimes subject to review. We obtained information on reviews from the court's ruling on the application as filed in the registry. That aspect is addressed in Table 8 . The numbers in the last row reflect the total nominations. We see that the Chamber of Labor asked for a review in 42 (more than 50 percent), and the Federal Financial Agency in 17 (slightly more than 20 percent) of all contracts. For the Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber of Agriculture, a review request is not observed but in one case, which is hardly surprising: both are representatives of enterprises.
Overall, a modification of the initial agreement was observed in 29 (36% of all) agreements. In many cases this involved just limiting the contract period necessitating an earlier renewal application and reducing the size of compensations to increase the flexibility of quotas. 14 Only in four cases, there was a disagreement during the review. But that disagreement was overruled by the cartel court. 
Auxiliary Collusive Clauses
In this subsection, we first look at additional means to implement the desired outcomes:
rules on pricing and discounts, capacity restrictions, and norms. Again, we relate these features to the main collusion methods categorized in the previous subsection.
Prices and Discounts: Additional Variables Table 9 provides details on pricing arrangements. Rules for quantity discounts are specified in one half of all payment condition agreements and in more than one third of the pure price fixing agreements. Many cartel contracts involving pricing and payment conditions also include a liability clause for sales agents, presumably serving as a precautionary device against delegating undercutting strategies. Five pure payment condition cartels are not combined with any of the clauses listed in Table 9 . Additional information from the database reveals that they are all active in textile manufacturing. 
Capacity restrictions
Contractual arrangements invoking capacity restrictions are an obvious instrument to restrict the quantities brought to the market, allowing the cartel to maintain high prices. Conversely, unrestricted capacity facilitates deviations (see for example, Ivaldi et al. (2003) ).
However, the numbers in Table 10 show that this instrument is used rarely-on average in less than a fifth of all cartel contracts. This may reflect the original intent of cartel legislation to foster exports: Imposing capacity restrictions would have limited exporting capabilities. Restrictions on capacity diversion (prohibiting the provision of free capacity by cartel members to outsiders) feature even less frequently-although capacity diversion could be quite easily used to undermine the cartel contract, by strengthening outsiders' production potential. 
Norms
To control the cartelists' pricing decisions effectively and reduce the dimensionality of the pricing arrangements, we expected frequent restrictions to be placed on product quality, lot sizes, or the reliance on official norms typically defined by a standard-setting body. In line with this prediction we observe, in Table 11 , that about two thirds of the cartels that contain pricing arrangements also involve specifications of that kind.
Joint Ventures
The cooperation of firms within an industry in research and development and (informative) advertising could lead to substantive savings in social costs, due to internalizing R&D externalities. Indeed, the competition laws in several countries, notably the U.S., allow explicitly for R&D cooperation of some form. The 1972 Austrian cartel law exempted research and development joint ventures and joint advertising from the registration requirement. Nevertheless, we observe that cooperation in these dimensions is explicitly foreseen in one fourth of all cartel contracts (Table 12) . Provisions for joint advertising are observed slightly more often than joint R&D. In particular, three out of the four contracts involving exclusive territories 15 also involve joint advertising.
Cartel Governance
One should expect that formal arrangements are much more prevalent in legal than illegal cartels. While the cartel contracts under scrutiny here contain governance rules in a detail we have not seen heretofore, they seem to be, at first glance, incomplete. We will discuss this at the points deemed relevant.
Below we summarize how cartels were organized and which rules were established to ensure stability: in Tables 13 -16 , we look at the prevalence of different decision making bodies depending on the type of cartel contract, as well as their responsibilities concerning decisions such as approval of entry, exclusion, and penalties. We then illustrate how dayto-day management is organized. The internal reporting and auditing schemes are reported in Tables 17 -19 . Compensation schemes as well as punishment of deviating behavior and its implementation are reported in Tables 20 -24 . Finally, we illustrate the rules governing entry and voluntary exit-information typically not available in this detail for detected illegal cartels.
Organization, Decision Making Bodies
The decision taking bodies we observe in the cartel contracts are the plenary meeting, with some decisions delegated to a committee, the executive officer or the authorized representative-usually a lawyer from a small set of Austrian law offices dealing with cartel issues-, and an arbitration panel in case of internal disputes. Table 13 shows that the plenary meeting and the arbitration panel are bodies introduced in most cartel contracts, followed by delegation of some decisions by the plenary meeting to an executive committee. By comparison, (pure) specialization cartels rely much less on such institutions. To a certain extent, this also holds for pure price setting cartels.
The database reveals that the six cartels without a formal decision making body have four members or less. Five of the six include a specialization clause. Specialization agreements thus stand out in terms of simple governance. These cartels appear to have no need for regular decisions, as adherence to the contracts specifying specialization are themselves sufficient to attain the desired outcome.
15 A subcategory of specialization reported in this table. Which key decisions are taken by which body? In Table 14 we report the bodies mentioned explicitly in the contracts. In a quarter to a third of all contracts, the plenary meeting is in charge of both, approval of entry and exclusion from the cartel. Only 20 cartel contracts explicitly specify an institution, namely the plenary meeting, to determine output, and only 19 do so for prices. Also, these decisions are delegated only in a small number of cases. However, one has to keep in mind that coordination on prices was feasible via the subcommittee on prices or via adhering to external reference prices. At last, for some cartels the plenary meeting is explicitly mentioned as responsible for all unspecified decisions. In 62 (or 77.5 %) of all contracts, an arbitration panel constitutes the supreme body dealing with appeals against imposed penalties. Note: Others includes staffed office, authorized representative or committee.
In Table 15 we summarize majorities required for decisions on cartel output, price(s) and entry/exclusion, respectively. The mean majorities required for output measures are very high. Mean majority levels on prices are substantively lower. By comparison, mean majorities involving entry/exclusion decisions vary substantially across cartel clauses-quota and specialization cartels require majorities next to unanimity for entry approval. Payment condition cartels are less restrictive towards entry. Finally, mean majorities required to force the exit of cartel members are quite low, and-with the exception of pure payment condition cartels-lower than those required for entry decisions. 
Day-to-Day Management
Formally established staffed offices with specified duties are definitely a distinctive advantage of legal over illegal cartels. In slightly more than one half of the cartels, day-to-day management is handled by a staffed office as shown in Table 16 .
35 per cent of cartels rely on independent auditors for investigations. In about 15
per cent of all cartels, primarily price and specialization cartels, a joint sales company is established, with the purpose of orchestrating the intermediation between the cartelists and their customers, and in particular maintaining control over the cartel arrangements. 
Information Transfer
The incentives to defect in legal cartels are akin to those in illegal ones. In particular, holding cartel prices above competitive levels invites price undercutting in order to increase market share and profits. Therefore, transferring accurate information and monitoring the behavior of cartel members is essential of sustaining cartel stability. In Table 17 we summarize the reporting requirements as indicated in the contracts. All pure quota cartels and 35 out of the 37 cartels involving a quota clause require regular reports from its members, 16 and most of them also require (additional) reports upon request. While regular reports are dominant in quota cartels, reports upon request are most common in pure payment condition cartels, with 12 out of 13 cartels agreements specifying them. We also observe that three of the seven pure price fixing cartels do not specify any reporting requirements.
A closer look at the 14 cartels not requiring any reporting reveals that six of them involve product specialization, custom, or territorial specialization. In these cases publicly available information may suffice to monitor conduct. The remaining cartels all fix prices, some of them supplementing the agreement with payment conditions. However, it remains an open question whether public information enables detection, or individual buyers are too small to trigger deviations by cartelists. Table 17 illustrates that regular reports are required in 46 out of the total of 80 contracts. In Table 18 we show the key items that had to be reported for these 46 contracts-35 of them quota cartels. In the majority of these contracts, namely 28 (61 percent) of them, quantities had to be reported. In roughly one third of the cartel contracts involving prices, payment conditions or some form of specialization, every individual sale had to be reported ex-post. Notification of ex-ante supply-often prices-is combined with payment conditions in eight of nine cases. For the two cartels with ex-ante demand reporting requirements, we also find joint sales companies. Naturally, regular reports on quantities are primarily required in quota cartels. A third of cartels including quota clauses require reporting ex-post aggregate sales without a pre-specified frequency of reports.
Regular Reports
Reports upon Request and Record Keeping Finally, we look at the 61 contracts reported in Table 17 that specify reports upon request in more detail in Table 19 . In 57 (93 percent) out of the 61 contracts, one of the decision making bodies could request information from the cartel members. In rare cases (4 out of 61) where the database lists we also observe a duty to account for exports.
Compensation Schemes
In quota cartels, the sharing rules are typically specified ex-ante, but not (exactly) realized ex-post. Thus, compensation schemes must be foreseen in the cartel contracts-to establish a cartel and to maintain its stability. In Table 20 we document the compensation schemes adopted by the cartels. Overall we find most quota cartels, 33 out of 37, foresee compensa- We looked at the remaining four quota cartel contracts in more detail to see whether they employed an alternative to a compensation scheme. One contract specifies that one member will stop production in exchange for lump sum, while the two remaining competitors agree on a compensation scheme in a separate agreement (insulated board). The Innsbruck hotel ring agrees on a quota on how to distribute incoming reservations at the central office. The edible oil producers operate via a joint sales company which is responsible for allocation of quotas. Only the producers of sickles and scythes fix quotas without specifying compensations.
Punishment of Deviators
Mechanisms to sanction deviations are necessary to sustain cartel stability. In Table 21 we document three forms of punishing deviators present in the cartel contracts: a formal warning of the cartel member not associated with any fines, monetary penalties, and the exclusion of the deviator from the cartel. Of all 80 cartel contracts, only 59 explicitly address the issue of punishment. At first, this seems to be a rather small share as we would have expected all cartel contracts to contain explicit punishment clauses. However, even in absence of a specified punishment scheme, deviators could be taken to court for violating the contract. A closer look at the remaining 21 cartels also reveals that 18 either specialize or rely on quotas. Specialization often makes cheating impossible, quota cartels sometimes rely solely on compensations but not on fines-but over-compensating cash payments create the same incentives on exceeding the quotas as do fines (see Harrington and Skrzypacz (2007) ). The remaining three cartels include a garbage recycling cartel operating a joint sales agency fully controlling prices and quotas, as well as a precious metal refining and a plumbing products cartel.
When we look at different forms of punishment, we observe that penalties are specified in only 50 and 57 percent of the pure quota and price cartels, respectively. Among pure payment condition cartels monetary penalty clauses are particularly common (85 %).
Quota cartels rely least often on explicit exclusion as a form of punishment. We may thus infer that they prefer to keep every member within the cartel rather than creating an outsider. In contrast, exclusion is a relatively frequent form of punishment foreseen in payment condition agreements. This suggests that cartels that restrict price cutting accept the risk to create an outsider.
In Table 22 we document the contract violations triggering monetary penalties. They are specified in only slightly more than 60% of all contracts. The primary violation mentioned is deviation from market oriented conduct as specified in the contract. This is followed by the provision of incorrect information and the refusal to provide information at all to the relevant institutions. Payment condition contracts specify contract violations triggering penalties most often, not only for market conduct but also for the refusal to supply information. Pure special-ization cartels do not impose any penalties for providing incorrect information or refusal of information provision. This also holds for all but one of the pure price cartels.
In Table 23 , we summarize the maximal monetary penalties quoted. While the maximum of these maximal penalties is about 75.000 Euros, the median of the maximal penalties, say in the pure price cartels, is only slightly above 5.000 Euros. We do not know how often such penalties were actually imposed on deviating firms. The median level of monetary penalties suggests that they were not critical in enforcement. 17 This is supported by the fact that fines were not adjusted over the observation period. Note: The consumer price index and the date of the agreement were used to calculate penalties in real terms.
To secure actual payment of the imposed penalties (and thus the credibility of punishment), the cartelists sometimes resorted to security deposits. They are reported in Table   24 . In 16 (20 percent) of the contracts, some form of security deposit was required by the cartelists, usually in form of a bill of exchange. These security deposits were actually unlimited in 9 (11 percent) of all contracts, requiring a blank bill of exchange. Both limited and unlimited security deposits are found most frequently in contracts involving payment condition clauses. While these provisions obviously made punishment of deviators quick and credible, members were usually allowed to appeal against imposition of penalties (and compensation payments) to the decision bodies described in section 4.3. Ten of our contracts included even two stages of appeal.
17 Note that we do however observe nine cartels with an unlimited security deposit, see Table 24 below. 
Entry-Exit Rules
Finally, we look at the rules for the entry of firms into, and the exit from the cartel arrangement. Rules for admitting entry were specified explicitly in one half, and corresponding rules for exit in fewer, namely only one fourth of all the contracts. This can be explained with any change in membership requiring the re-registration of the cartel. Re-registration in turn required the consent of all cartel members. As shown in Table 25 , an explicit approval of entry by one of the ruling decision bodies was primarily required in specialization cartels. The voluntary exit of a firm from the cartel usually required a six month's notice, the maximal period allowed by cartel law. Several cartel contracts contained clauses by which following the exit of a cartel member, the remaining members were allowed to exit immediately. This allows for the immediate dissolution of a cartel upon exit by one member. Quota cartels rely on such a clause most frequently.
Key Findings by Collusion Method
We categorized the agreements found in the cartel registry into four different methods of collusion: quota, specialization, price, and payment conditions. The majority of contracts used more than just one of the four instruments. In particular, the cartels combining quota, price and payment conditions (11 contracts) and price and payment conditions (9 contracts) account for a quarter of all agreements.
Quota cartels
Quota cartels-36 out of 37 are in manufacturing-are often combined with other collusive instruments, but least often with payment condition cartels. They are smallest in terms of members, never including more than 21 members. Quota cartels often require unanimity among members on the admission of new members into the cartel and output decisions.
Voting by less efficient cartel members could therefore lead to prices above monopoly prices as argued in Cave and Salant (1995) . They often rely on a staffed office for internal management.
Regular reporting requirements are typical for quota cartels. Cash payments are the central mechanism to compensate for not exactly realized quotas, followed by transfer of orders or customers and sales between cartelists. Some quota cartels punish not only for deviating conduct, but also for failure to provide (correct) information. The provisions for regular reporting mechanisms as well as compensation schemes allowing for asymmetric treatment of deviators and non-deviators are in line with the theoretical work on quota cartels as in Harrington and Skrzypacz (2007) and more recently Harrington and Skrzypacz (2011) .
If a member leaves the cartel, quota cartels allow, more often than others, immediate exit by the remaining members, indicating the possible Nash reversal as a threat. As in Harrington (2006) allocated market shares are remarkably stable over cartel duration, with only entry triggering an adjustment. We do not observe adjustments of market shares in response to capacity investments as in Harrington (2006) . The ease of use of cash payments in a legal collusive environment may have further added to the stability of market shares.
Specialization cartels
Specialization cartels are the 26 agreements specifying the allocation of products, customers, suppliers and territories. More than a quarter of them are export cartels. Pure specialization cartels are less concerned with avoiding secret price cuts such as favorable payment conditions or discounts. Three out of the four agreements specifying exclusive territories also engage in joint advertising. They are most simple in terms of internal decision making bodies, some managing without any. However, about one quarter of them rely on joint sales agencies.
Only one of the seven pure specialization cartel relies on regular member reports. In general, specialization cartels are the ones least reliant on information exchange and internal punishments. Specialization cartels stand out in terms of explicitly regulating entry into the cartel. Unanimous approval by existing members is regularly required to accept a new member. We also observed the lowest rate of reviews of such cartels in the registration process, suggesting that they were considered as the least damaging. In the few instances of direct customer allocation, historical precedent plays an important role as also observed by Harrington (2006) . Overall the nature of the observed contracts confirms Stigler's (1964) view of the simplicity of this collusion method, although it is an option only for specific and easily divisible narrow markets.
Price cartels
The 41 price cartels use clauses such as a fixed price, price floors, price books, common costing sheets or price adjustments. Only seven cartels are pure price cartels. These pure price agreements are the simplest as reflected by the fact that the contracts are the shortest. Most often these price agreements use further clauses to prevent secret price cutting. These include specific rules on payment conditions and the liability of sales agents to prevent resellers from undermining cartel objectives (a problem often faced by illegal cartels (Harrington (2006) and Genesove and Mullin (2001)). Norms on quality and lot size are most common for such cartels, apparently to avoid non-price competition. Some price cartels agree to an external reference price instead of fixing prices themselves. Decision taking is sometimes delegated to a body where not all members are represented, required majorities are on average lower than for decisions on output in quota cartels. On average these cartels have more members than quota cartels. One fifth of price cartels manage without any information exchange. Penalties are quite common.
Payment condition cartels
We have 44 agreements regulating payment conditions. They aim at preventing secret price cuts and are mainly combined with price clauses, often including clear rules on quantity or sales channels discounts and liability for sales agents. Payment condition cartels stand out by the sheer size in terms of number of members, as well as contract length and number of decision bodies as measures of complexity. About two thirds have a central staffed office for management. In these cartels information provision upon request is most prominent. Some even require notification of supply-often price-ex-ante, i.e. before a transaction takes place. Non-compliance with information exchange rule is often penalized.
Punishment-be it a simple warning, a monetary penalty or exclusion-is most frequently specified in payment condition cartels. Half of them even require (sometimes unlimited) security deposits for immediate enforcement. The 13 pure payment condition cartels are reminiscent of the Sugar Institute (Genesove and Mullin (2001) ), homogenizing business practices and specifying reporting schemes to make pricing more transparent.
Summary and Conclusion
We have provided descriptive evidence on registered legal cartels in Austria. We find that firms used the possibility to write legally binding cartel contracts to prevent secret price cuts, the main impediment to attain a collusive outcome according to Stigler (1964) . We find contractual arrangements requiring regular reporting in quota cartels to avoid information lags. Legal cartels make use of cash payments between cartelists to compensate for departures from the agreed outcome, allowing the cartel to efficiently respond to asymmetric developments in cost and demand.
Rather than just relying on the opportunity to take a party to court when violating the contract, the majority of cartels agreements specify penalties for deviating behavior (both in terms of market behavior and information provision). This is sometimes supplemented with requiring cash deposits, ensuring that punishment for deviating behavior is not only quick but also credible. Compensation payments and penalties enable them to treat deviators and non-deviators differently, which has been shown to be often necessary to sustain collusion (Harrington and Skrzypacz (2007) ).
Non-price competition is prevented by agreeing on product norms and delivery conditions. In line with Genesove and Mullin (2001) we find that also legal cartels delegate discretionary power to bodies to cope with the inevitable incompleteness of contracts. The legally binding nature of contracts allow the parties to bestow decision making authority to these bodies on issues including prices, quantities, entry and in particular penalties. 29.14 2 Producers of engine bearings and bearing bushings agree on product specialization, payment conditions and a price book. 29.14 n.a. Suppliers of motor repair services agree on payment conditions, quantity and sales channels discounts. 31.30 9 Producers of power cables form a joint sales agency for domestic and export markets; they agree on sales quotas, customer specialization, payment conditions, a fixed price and quantity discounts; they use a price book and a common costing she 31.30
A Tables
18 Firms agree on a price book for installation services for low-and high tension current; they use a common costing sheet, base the price on average cost and condition the price on travel distance. 31.30
8 Producers of insulated cable form an exclusive joint sales agency for domestic and export markets, agree on product and customer specialization, fix the price, use a price book and regulate quantity discounts; They are liable for their sales 31.50 6 producers of light bulbs fix payment conditions and quantity discounts also for themselves and for sales agents. Additionally, capacity is restricted. 36.21 4 precious metal refiners cooperate in buying and selling, the price is based on a common costing sheet. 40.20 9 distributors of liquid gas agree on a floor for the security deposit for 33 kilo gas cylinders. 50.10 8 Opel retailers agree on a price floor and include sales agents, too. 51.43 8 disc producers agree on payment conditions and quantity discounts. 51.46 14 wholesalers of pharmaceuticals that are subject to retail price regulation agree on payment conditions and quantity discounts. 51.46 61 producers of pharmaceuticals that are subject to retail price regulation agree on payment conditions, liability of sales agents and quantity discounts. 51.47 76 wholesaler of general rubber goods and asbestos goods agree on payment conditions, quantity discounts, sales channels discounts and liability for sales agents. 51.47 13 importers and producers of photographic cameras and related products agree on payment conditions and liability of sales agents; a central part of the agreement are rules for standardized distribution agreements for retailers. 51.56 49 wholesaler of paper and card board agree on a price book, payment conditions and quantity discounts and use a common costing sheet. 51.65 53 Wholesalers of insulated cables cooperate in joint buying, importing and selling; they fix payment conditions, use a price book to fix prices, regulate quantity discounts and restrict capacity. 52.11 2 A grocery and a restaurant in a local village agree to specialize on grocery and restaurant services respectively. 52.48 31 Retailers of solid and liquid fuels that are subject to retail price regulation agree on a price book, payment conditions, quantity discounts and use a common costing sheet; the agreement covers only Linz and its surroundings. 
